






In this paper we study inheritance properties of average convexity in commu-
nication situations. We show that the underlying graph ensures that the graph-
restricted game originating from an average convex game is average convex if and
only if every subgraph associated with a component of the underlying graph is the
complete graph or a star graph. Furthermore, we study inheritance of (average)
convexity of the associated potential games.
Journal of Economic Literature classication numbers: C71.
1 Introduction
A communication situation is a cooperative game with communication restrictions. The
communication possibilities are modelled by means of an undirected (communication)
graph. Myerson (1977) was the rst to study these communication situations. He
introduced the graph-restricted game and he provided an axiomatization of the Shapley
value of these games. This value is usually referred to as the Myerson value.
Posterior papers have analyzed properties of graph-restricted games. Owen (1986)
shows that superadditivity of a game implies superadditivity of the graph-restricted
game. Nouweland and Borm (1991) show that if the communication graph is cycle-
complete and the cooperative game convex, then the graph-restricted game is convex.1
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comments.
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1Nouweland and Borm (1991) refer to the graph-restricted game as the point game.
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Furthermore, they show that if the communicationgraph is not cycle-completethen there
exists a convex cooperative game such that the graph-restricted game is not convex. In
this paper we will study the class of graphs which ensure that if the underlying game is
average convex then the graph-restricted game is average convex.
Average convexity was introduced by I~ narra and Usategui (1993). They study the
necessary and sucient conditions for the Shapley value of a game in characteristic
function form to lie in the core. As a by-product, they introduce the class of average
convex games and show that the Shapley value of an average convex game lies in the
core. Since a subgame of an average convex game is average convex as well, it holds that
the Shapley value of a subgame belongs to the core of this subgame. Sprumont (1990)
showed that the extended Shapley value of an average convex game is a population
monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS).2
Mar n-Solano and Rafels (1996) study connections between convexand average convex
games. They show that the Shapley values for a game and all its subgames lie in the
corresponding cores if and only if the associated potential game (cf. Hart and Mas-Colell
(1989)) is average convex. Furthermore, they show that the extended Shapley value is a
population monotonic allocation scheme if and only if the associated potential game is
convex.
In this paper we show that inheritance of average convexity of a game by the graph-
restricted game is guaranteed if and only if every subgraph associated with a component
of the underlying graph is the complete graph or a star graph. Furthermore, we study
the relation between (average) convexity of an associated potential game and (average)
convexity of the potential game associated with the graph-restricted game. We nd that
except the complete graphs, there is essentially no graph that ensures inheritance of
convexityof the potential game associated with a cooperative game by the potential game
associated with the graph-restricted game. Finally, we nd with respect to potential
games that inheritance of average convexity is ensured for the same class of graphs
that ensure inheritance of average convexity of the underlying cooperative game by the
graph-restricted game.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides some notations and deni-
tions. Section 3 deals with the inheritance of average convexity of a game by the graph-
restricted game. Inheritance of convexity and average convexity of the corresponding
potential games is studied in section 4. In section 5 we conclude with a remark.
2Sprumont (1990) refers to an average convex game as a quasi-convex game.3
2 Notation
A cooperative game is a pair (N;v), where N = f1;:::;ng denotes the set of players
and v :2 N !I R the characteristic function. If no confusion can arise we sometimes refer
to a game by its characteristic function. A cooperative game (N;v) is convex if for all
i 2 N and all T1  T2  N with i 2 T1 it holds that3
v(T1) − v(T1nfig)  v(T2) − v(T2nfig):
So, a game is convex if the marginal contribution of a player to any coaltion is less than
his marginal contribution to a larger coalition.
I~ narra and Usategui (1993) introduced the class of average convex games. A game







So, a game is average convex if for any coalition the sum (average) of marginal con-
tributions for the players in this coalition is less than the sum (average) of marginal
contributions for the same players in a larger coalition. Note that convexity implies
average convexity. Mar n-Solano and Rafels (1996) remark that average convex games
are superadditive.
A communication graph is a pair (N;L) where the set of vertices N represents the
set of players and the set of edges L represents the set of bilateral (communication)
links. Two players i and j are directly connected i fi;jg2L .T w o p l a y e r s i and j
are connected (directly or indirectly) i i = j or there exists a path between players i
and j. The notion of connectedness induces a partition of the player set into commu-
nication components, where two players are in the same communication component if
and only if they are connected. The set of communication components will be denoted
by N=L. The component C 2 N=L containing player i 2 N will be denoted by Ci(L).
Furthermore, denote the subgraph on the vertices in coalition S  N by (S;L(S)), where
L(S)=ffi;jg2Ljf i;jgS g , and the partition of S into communication components
according to graph (S;L(S)) by S=L.
Myerson (1977) studied communication situations (N;v;L)w h e r e( N;v) is a cooper-






v(C) ; for all S  N:
3S  N denotes that S is a subset of N, S  N denotes that S is a strict subset of N.4
So, a coalition is split into communication components and the value of this coalition in
the graph-restricted game is then dened as the sum of the values of the communication
components in the original game. The Shapley value of the game (N;vL) is usually
referred to as the Myerson value of communication situation (N;v;L). The Myerson
value will be denoted by (N;v;L).
3 Average convexity
In this section we describe the class of communication graphs for which average convexity
of the original game implies average convexity of the graph-restricted game.
First consider the class of communication graphs for which convexity of the original
game is inherited by the graph-restricted game (see Nouweland and Borm (1991)).
Denition 3.1 Ag r a p h( N;L)i scycle-complete if the following holds: if
(x1;x 2;:::;x k;x 1) is a cycle in the graph then fxi;x jg2Lfor all i;j 2f 1 ;:::;kg
with i 6= j.
So, for every cycle the complete graph on the vertices forming this cycle is a subgraph
of (N;L). Note that all cycle-free graphs and the complete graph are cycle-complete.
The following theorem follows straightforward from example 3 of Nouweland and
Borm (1991). They construct for each communication graph that is not cycle-complete
a convex game such that the corresponding graph-restricted game is not convex. We will
show that these graph-restricted games are not even average convex.
Theorem 3.1 Let (N;L) be a communication graph that is not cycle-complete. Then
there exists a convex game (N;v) such that the graph-restricted game is not average
convex.
Proof: Since (N;L) is not cycle-complete, there is a cycle (x1;:::;x k;x 1)i n( N;L)a n d
i;j 2f 1 ;:::;kgwith i<j− 1, fxi;x jg6 2Land fxm;x jg2Lfor all m 2f i +1;:::;j−1g.
Consider the convex game (N;v)w h e r ev ( S )=j S j−1 for all S  N, S 6= ;. Dene

















Hence, the game (N;vL) is not average convex.
2
Now, the following result follows directly from theorem 3.1.5
Corollary 3.1 Let (N;L) be a communication graph. Then the following two state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) The graph (N;L) is cycle-complete.
(ii) For all convex (N;v) the graph-restricted game (N;vL) is average convex.
Proof: Follows directly from theorem 3.1 above and theorem 1 of Nouweland and Borm
(1991), which states that if (N;L) is cycle-complete and (N;v)c o n v e x ,t h e n( N;vL)i s
convex and hence average convex.
2
The corollary above states that cycle-completeness of the underlying graph is neces-
sary for convexity of the cooperative game to guarantee average convexity of the graph-
restricted game. Hence, cycle-completeness is a necessary condition on the underlying
graph to guarantee that average convexity of the cooperative game is inherited by the
graph-restricted game. The following example shows that this condition is not sucient.
Example 3.1 Consider the following communication situation: N = f1;2;3;4g, L =
ff1;2g;f2;3g;f3;4g;f4;2gg (see gure 1) and v such that
v(S)=
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 ; j S j=1o rS2f f 1 ;2 g ;f 1 ;3 g ;f 2 ;4 gg
6 ;S2f f 1 ;4 g ;f 3 ;4 g ;f 2 ;3 gg






Figure 1: The graph (N;L).
Note that the communication graph (N;L) is cycle-complete. It can be checked that
the game (N;v) is average convex. Note that (N;v) is not convex since
v(f2;3g) − v(f3g)=6>3=v ( f 2 ;3 ;4 g )−v ( f 3 ;4 g ) :6




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 ; j S j=1o rS2f f 1 ;2 g ;f 1 ;3 g ;f 1 ;4 g ;f 2 ;4 gg
6 ;S2f f 3 ;4 g ;f 2 ;3 g ;f 1 ;3 ;4 gg
9 ;S2f f 1 ;2 ;3 g ;f 1 ;2 ;4 g ;f 2 ;3 ;4 gg
16 ;S= N
:
















Hence, (N;vL) is not average convex.
The example above shows that we can nd cycle-complete graphs for which average
convexity of a game need not be inherited by the associated graph-restricted game. The
graph in the example above contains a cycle. Hence, we wonder whether cycle-freeness
might be sucient to guarantee inheritance of average convexity. The following example
shows cycle-freeness is not sucient either.
Example 3.2 Consider the following communication situation: N = f1;2;3;4g, L =
ff1;2g;f2;3g;f3;4gg (see gure 2) and v such that
v(S)=
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 ; j S j=1o rS2f f 1 ;3 g ;f 1 ;4 g ;f 2 ;3 gg
8 ;S2f f 1 ;2 g ;f 2 ;4 g ;f 3 ;4 g ;f 1 ;2 ;3 g ;f 1 ;3 ;4 gg
14 ;S2f f 1 ;2 ;4 g ;f 2 ;3 ;4 gg
19 ;S= N
:
1 2 3 4
Figure 2: The graph (N;L).
It can be checked that (N;v) is average convex. However, since
v(f1;2;3g) − v(f2;3g)=8>5=v ( N)−v ( f 2 ;3 ;4 g )
the game (N;v) is not convex.7




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 ; j S j=1o rS2f f 1 ;3 g ;f 1 ;4 g ;f 2 ;3 g ;f 2 ;4 gg
8 ;S2f f 1 ;2 g ;f 3 ;4 g ;f 1 ;2 ;3 g ;f 1 ;3 ;4 g ;f 1 ;2 ;4 gg
14 ;S2f f 2 ;3 ;4 gg
19 ;S= N
:








=6 + 1 4 + 1 4 = 3 4









Hence, (N;vL) is not average convex.
The examples above indicate that the set of graphs that ensure that for an average
convex game the corresponding graph-restricted game is also average convex is restricted.
However, the following set of graphs ensure inheritance of average convexity.
Denition 3.2 Ag r a p h( N;L)i sastar graph if there exists i 2 N such that L =
ffi;jgjj2Nnfigg.
In a star graph there is one central player who is directly connected with all other
players and there are no links in which this player is not involved. The following theorem
shows that for a star graph the average convexity of a game implies average convexity
of the corresponding graph-restricted game.
Theorem 3.2 Let (N;v;L) be a communication situation where the underlying game
(N;v) is average convex and the underlying communication graph (N;L) a star graph.
Then the graph-restricted game (N;vL) is also average convex.
Proof: Without loss of generality assume that player 1 is the central player in the star
graph. Let T1  T2  N.I f162 T1 it is obvious that T1=L = ffjgjj2T 1g ,a n df o ra l l
i2T 1,( T 1nfig)=L = ffjgjj2T 1nfigg. If additionally, 1 62 T2,w eh a v e
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If 1 2 T2,w eh a v e
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where, the inequality follows from superadditivity of (N;v).4
Now assume that 1 2 T1. This implies that T1=L = fT1g and (T1nfig)=L = fT1nfigg










































By average convexity of (N;v)w eh a v e
X
i 2 T 1
[ v ( T 1)−v ( T 1nfig)] 
X
i2T1







4 v ( T 1 nf1g)+
X
j2 T 2n T 1










where the inequality follows from superadditivity of (N;v).

















4We remind the reader that average convexity implies superadditivity.9
We conclude that (N;vL) is average convex.
2
The main theorem of this section gives necessary and sucient conditions on the
communication graph to ensure that the graph-restricted game corresponding to an
average convex game is average convex. Before we can prove this theorem we need some
lemmas. The following lemma states that if a connected graph is cycle-complete, not
cycle-free, and not complete, then we can nd a subgraph which is similar to the graph
of example 3.1.
Lemma 3.1 Let (N;L) be a connected graph that is (i) cycle-complete, (ii) not com-
plete, and (iii) not cycle-free. Then there exist x1;x 2;x 3;x 42N such that
L(fx1;x 2;x 3;x 4g)=
n
f x 1;x 2g;fx 2;x 3g;fx 3;x 4g;fx 4;x 2g
o
:
Moreover, for such x1;x 2;x 3;x 4 and for all (N;v)w i t hv ( S )=v ( S\f x 1;x 2;x 3;x 4g)f o r
all S  N it holds that vL(S)=v L( S\f x 1;x 2;x 3;x 4g) for all S  N.
Proof: As e tSNis called a clique in (N;L)i ff i;jg2Lfor all fi;jgS . A clique
S  N is called a maximal clique in (N;L) it there is no clique T with T  S.
Since (N;L) is not cycle-free it contains at least one cycle, and hence, jNj3. By
cycle-completeness we then know that there is a clique containing at least three vertices.
Let T be a maximal clique in (N;L) containing at least three vertices. Since (N;L)i s
not complete we have T  N. Because (N;L) is a connected graph there exist i 2 T,
j 2 NnT with fi;jg2L .T is a maximal clique, so there exists k 2 T with fk;jg6 2L .
Cycle-completeness of (N;L) then implies that i must be the unique vertex in T directly
connected with j. Dene x1 = j, x2 = i,a n dl e tx 3 ;x 4 2 Tnfig with x3 6= x4.T h e n
L ( f x 1 ;x 2;x 3;x 4g)=
n
f x 1;x 2g;fx 2;x 3g;fx 3;x 4g;fx 4;x 2g
o
.
Let (N;v) be a cooperative game with v(S)=v ( S\f x 1;x 2;x 3;x 4g) for all S  N








v(C\f x 1;x 2;x 3;x 4g): (5)
Let xi;x j 2 C 2 T=L with fi;jgf 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 g .T h e n x iand xj are connect-
ed directly or fxi;x jg2f f x 1 ;x 3g;fx 1;x 4gg.I f f x i ;x jg2f f x 1 ;x 3g;fx 1;x 4gg then
ffxi;x 2g;fx 2;x jgg  L.S i n c ef x i ;x jg6 2Lit follows by cycle-completeness that every
path between xi and xj is via x2.S i n c e x iand xj both belong to component C this
implies that x2 2 C as well. We conclude that for all xi;x j 2 C 2 T=L there exists
D 2 (T \f x 1;x 2;x 3;x 4g)=L with xi;x j 2D.10
Obviously, if xi;x j are connected via links in L(T \f x 1;x 2;x 3;x 4g) then they are




v(C\f x 1;x 2;x 3;x 4g)=
X
D 2 ( T\fx1;x2;x3;x4g)=L
v(D)=v
L( T\f x 1;x 2;x 3;x 4g): (6)
Combining equations (5) and (6) gives the desired result.
2
The following lemma shows that if a connected graph is cycle-free, but not a star-
graph, then it contains a subgraph similar to the graph in example 3.2.
Lemma 3.2 Let (N;L) be a connected graph that is (i) not a star graph and (ii) cycle-
free. Then there exist x1;x 2;x 3;x 42N such that
L(fx1;x 2;x 3;x 4g)=
n
f x 1;x 2g;fx 2;x 3g;fx 3;x 4g
o
:
Moreover, for such x1;x 2;x 3;x 4 and for all (N;v)w i t hv ( S )=v ( S\f x 1;x 2;x 3;x 4g)f o r
all S  N it holds that vL(S)=v L( S\f x 1;x 2;x 3;x 4g) for all S  N.
Proof: Since (N;L) is connected, cycle-free, and not a star graph it follows immediately
that jNj4. Furthermore, since (N;L) is cycle-free we just have to show that there
exist two vertices for which the shortest path connecting them consists of three links.
Since (N;L) is connected and cycle-free (a tree) we have jLj = jNj−1. If we denote
the degree of i by (i)=jfj jf i;jg2L gj,t h e nw eh a v e
P
i 2 N ( i )=2 j N j−2. Since
(N;L) is not a star graph but cycle-free we have for all i 2 N that (i) j Nj−2. Then
it readily follows that there exist i;j 2 N, i 6= j,w i t h ( i )2a n d ( j )2.
Since (N;L) is a tree there exists a unique path between two players, which is conse-
quently the shortest path between them. The path between i and j consists of at least
one link. Since the degree of both i and j is at least 2, we can nd a vertex k directly
connected to i and a vertex l directly connected to j both not on the (shortest) path
between i and j.S i n c e ( N;L) is cycle-free, the (shortest) path between l and k is via
i and j and hence, we found a pair of vertices with the shortest path between them
consisting of at least three links. Denote this path by (x1;:::;x m). Then obviously,
since m  4, L(fx1;x 2;x 3;x 4g)=
n
f x 1;x 2g;fx 2;x 3g;fx 3;x 4g
o
.
Cycle-freeness implies that (x1;x 2;x 3;x 4) is the unique path from player x1 to player
x4.L e t T N and xi;x j 2f x 1 ;x 2;x 3;x 4g\T. Obviously, there exists C 2 T=L
with xi;x j 2C if and only if there exists D 2 (T \f x 1;x 2;x 3;x 4g)=L with xi;x j 2D.11
Hence, fC \f x 1;x 2;x 3;x 4gjC2T=Lg =( T\f x 1;x 2;x 3;x 4g)=L.I f ( N;v)s a t i s  e s












L( T\f x 1;x 2;x 3;x 4g):
This completes the proof.
2
The following theorem deals with average convexity inheritance in case the underlying
graph is connected.
Theorem 3.3 Let (N;L) be a communication graph with N the unique component.
Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) The communication graph (N;L) is a complete graph or a star graph.
(ii) For all average convex games (N;v) the graph-restricted game (N;vL) is average
convex.
Proof:
(i))(ii) Let (N;v) be an average convex game. If (N;L) is complete then vL = v and
hence (N;vL) is average convex. If (N;L) is a star graph it follows from theorem 3.2
that (N;vL) is average convex.
(ii))(i) Assume (ii) holds. Since every convex game is average convex, we have that for
all convex games (N;v) the graph-restricted game is average convex. Then by corollary
3.1 we know that (N;L) is cycle-complete. Now suppose that (N;L) is not complete and
not a star graph. We will show that then condition (ii) is violated. We will distinguish
between two cases, (N;L) is not cycle-free and (N;L) is cycle-free.
First suppose that (N;L) is not cycle-free. From lemma 3.1 it follows that there ex-
ists fx1;x 2;x 3;x 4gNwith L(fx1;x 2;x 3;x 4g)=ffx1;x 2g;fx 2;x 3g;fx 3;x 4g;fx 4;x 2gg.
Without loss of generality assume xi = i for all i 2f 1 ;2 ;3 ;4 g . Now construct the game
(N;w) as follows: w(S)=v ( S\f 1 ;2 ;3 ;4 g ) for all S  N,w h e r evis the characteristic
function of the game in example 3.1. From lemma 3.1 it follows for all S  N that
wL(S)=w L( S\f 1 ;2 ;3 ;4 g )=v L 1( S\f 1 ;2 ;3 ;4 g ), where L1 denotes the graph of ex-
ample 3.1. Using example 3.1 it is obvious that (N;w) is average convex but (N;wL)i s
not.
Secondly suppose that (N;L) is cycle-free. From lemma 3.2 it follows that there exists
fx1;x 2;x 3;x 4gNwith L(fx1;x 2;x 3;x 4g)=ffx1;x 2g;fx 2;x 3g;fx 3;x 4gg. Without
loss of generality assume xi = i for all i 2f 1 ;2 ;3 ;4 g . Now construct the game (N;z)a s12
follows: z(S)=v ( S\f 1 ;2 ;3 ;4 g ) for all S  N,w h e r evis the characteristic function
of the game in example 3.2. From lemma 3.2 it follows for all S  N that zL(S)=
z L ( S\f 1 ;2 ;3 ;4 g )=v L 2( S\f 1 ;2 ;3 ;4 g ), where L2 denotes the graph of example 3.2.
Using example 3.2 it is obvious that (N;z) is average convex but (N;zL)i sn o t .
2
We will extend theorem 3.3 to graphs with more than one component. To do so, we
need two more lemmas.
The following lemma deals with the component additivity of graph-restricted games.
It states that average convexity of a graph-restricted game is equivalent to average con-
vexity of all the subgames associated with the components of the graph. The charac-
teristic function vL restricted to the subcoalitions of a coalition C will be denoted by
(vL)jC.
Lemma 3.3 Let (N;v;L) be a communication situation. The graph-restricted game
(N;vL) is average convex if and only if for all C 2 N=L the game (C;(vL)jC) is average
convex.
Proof: The only-if-part follows directly from the fact that for all C 2 N=L and all
T  C we have vL(T)=( v L) j C( T).
It remains to prove the if-part. Assume that the game (C;(vL)jC) is average convex
for all for all C 2 N=L.L e tT 1T 2N .T h e nw eh a v e ,
X
i 2 T 1
h















































The rst equality follows from the additive denition of the graph-restricted game, which
implies that for all S  N, vL(S)=
P
C 2 N=LvL(S \ C). The third equality follows
since vL(T1 \ C) − vL((T1nfig) \ C)=0i fi2T 1n C . The inequality follows from the
average convexity of the subgames (C;(vL)jC) and the notion that for all T  C we have
vL(T)=( v L) j C( T). The last equality follows similar to the rst three equalities.
2
The following lemma gives a relation between average convexity inheritance for all
games with a xed player set and average convexity inheritance for a subset of this player
set.13
Lemma 3.4 Let (N;L) be a communication graph that ensures that for every average
convex game (N;v) the graph-restricted game (N;vL) is average convex as well. Let
C 2 N=L.I f( C;w) is average convex then (C;wL(C)) is average convex.
Proof: Let (C;w) be an average convex game. Dene the game (N;v)b yv ( S ): =
w ( S \ C ) for all S  N. Hence, all players in NnC are zero players. Obviously, (N;v)i s
average convex, which implies that (N;vL) is average convex. Since the subgame of an
average convex game is average convex and (vL)jC = wL(C) we conclude that (C;wL(C))
is average convex.
2
Using the lemmas above we can prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 3.4 Let (N;L) be a communicationgraph. Then the following two statements
are equivalent:
(i) For all C 2 N=L it holds that (C;L(C)) is a complete graph or a star graph.
(ii) For all average convex games (N;v) the graph-restricted game (N;vL) is average
convex.
Proof: Suppose (i) holds. Let (N;v) be an average convex game. Then, since a subgame
of an average convex is average convex, it holds that for all C 2 N=L,( C;vjC) is average
convex as well. Since (C;L(C)) is a complete graph or a star graph for all C 2 N=L,
it follows by theorem 3.3 that for all C 2 N=L,( C;(vjC)L(C)) is average convex. Since
(vjC)L(C) =( v L) j C it follows by lemma 3.3 that (N;vL) is average convex. So, (ii) holds.
Suppose (ii) holds. Let C 2 N=L. By lemma 3.4 we have that for all average convex
(C;w) it holds that (C;wL(C)) is average convex as well. By theorem 3.3, this implies
that (C;L(C)) is a complete graph or a star graph and hence (i) holds.
This completes the proof.
2
4 Potential games
In this section we will study inheritance of (average) convexity of the potential game as-
sociated with a specic game by the potential game associated with the graph-restricted
game.
Potential games associated with cooperative games, were rst introduced by Hart
and Mas-Colell (1989). They dene for every game (N;v) an associated potential game




jRjuR,w h e r ev=
P
R  N Ru Ris the unique linear de-
compostion of (N;v) into unanimity games.5 Note that a cooperative game completely
5uR(S)=1i fRSand uR(S) = 0 otherwise. See Shapley (1953).14
determines its associated potential game and vice versa. For convenience we will some-
times refer to an associated potential game instead of to a potential game associated
with some underlying cooperative game.
In Mar n-Solano and Rafels (1996) it is shown that the associated potential game is
average convex if and only if the Shapley values of the original game and all related
subgames are in the corresponding cores. Furthermore, they showed that the extended
Shapley value (i(S;vjS))SN; i2S is a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS)
if and only if the associated potential game is convex.6
So, it is interesting to see whether (average) convexity of the potential game as-
sociated with a specic game is inherited by the potential game associated with the
graph-restricted game. First we will focus on convexity. It follows from Nouweland and
Borm (1991) that if (N;L) is cycle-complete and (N;Pv)c o n v e x ,t h e n( N;(Pv)L)i s
convex. The following example shows that this does not imply that (N;P(vL)) is convex
as well.
Example 4.1 Consider the communication situation (N;v;L)w i t hN=f 1 ;2 ;3 g ,
v=2 u f 1 ; 2 g+2 u f 1 ; 3 g+2 u f 2 ; 3 g−3 u N;
and L = ff1;2g;f2;3gg.T h e nw eh a v e
Pv=uf1;2g+uf1;3g+uf2;3g−uN:
So, (N;Pv) is convex. Since (N;L) is cycle-complete (in fact the graph is cycle-free, or
even stronger, a star graph) we wonder whether (N;P(vL)) is also convex. Note that
we already know that (N;(Pv)L)i sc o n v e xs i n c e( N;L) is cycle-complete and (N;Pv)
convex.
Some calculations result in
v
L =2 u f 1 ; 2 g+2 u f 2 ; 3 g−u N:
Hence, we nd that
P(v









=P( v L)(f1;2;3g) − P(v
L)(f2;3g)
it follows that (N;P(vL)) is not convex.
6A vector (xi;S)SN; i2S is a PMAS of (N;v) if and only if for all S  N it holds that (i)
P
i2S xi;S =
v(S) and (ii) for all T with S  T  N and all i 2 S, xi;S  xi;T.15
This example can easily be extended to show that for all graphs with at least one non-
complete component, convexity of (N;Pv) need not be inherited by (N;P(vL)). So, the
example above shows that besides the complete graphs we cannot nd connected graphs
that ensure inheritance of convexity of the associated potential game in a communication
situation. Since inheritance of average convexity of a cooperative game by the graph-
restricted game is ensured for a subclass of the class of graphs that ensure inheritance
of convexity, one could think that it will not be possible to nd an interesting class of
graphs that ensures inheritance of average convexity of the associated potential game.
Surprisingly, inheritance of average convexity of the associated potential game is ensured
for exactly the same class of graphs for which inheritance of average convexity of the
underlying game is ensured.
We will use the following result of Mar n-Solano and Rafels (1996).
Theorem 4.1 A cooperative game (N;v) is an average convex game if and only if its
unanimity coordinates (R)RN satisfy
X
RT; R\Sc6=;
jS\RjR 0 ; for any S  T  N (7)
where Sc = NnS.
Using this we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Let (N;v) be an average convex and zero-normalized cooperative game
with v =
P
RN RuR.T h e nf o ri2N :
X




Proof: Dene the cooperative game (N [f d g ;z) by adding a dummy player d 62 N to
the game (N;v), i.e. z(S)=v ( S\N) for all S  N [f d g . Average convexity of (N;v)
implies average convexity of (N [f d g ;z).Consider the star graph (N [f d g ;L)w i t hd
the central player, L = ffj;dgjj2Ng . By theorem 3.3 it follows that (N [f d g ;zL)i s
average convex.
Denote the unanimity coordinates of (N [f d g ;zL)b y(  R ) R  N [fdg.T h e p o t e n t i a l
game corresponding to an average convex game is average convex.7 Since the unanimity
7Average convexity implies that the Shapley values of the game and all its subgames belong to the
respective cores. This holds if and only if the associated potential game is average convex.16
coordinates of (N [f d g ;P(zL)) are (
R
jRj)RN[fdg it follows by theorem 4.1 with S = fig






Since R =0 ,i fd62 R or R 2f f j;dgjj2N g(by zero-normalization of (N;w)) and
R = Rnfdg,o t h e r w i s e ,w ec o n c l u d e
P




Using the lemma above we can prove that if the underlying communication graph is
a star graph, then average convexity of the potential game associated with a cooperative
game impliesaverage convexityof the potential game associated withthe graph-restricted
game.
Theorem 4.2 Let (N;v;L) be a communication situation where the associated poten-
tial game (N;Pv) is average convex and the communication graph (N;L) a star graph.
Then the potential game (N;P(vL)) corresponding to the graph-restricted game (N;vL)
is average convex.
Proof: First recall that (N;Pw) is average convex if and only if (wjT) 2 C(wjT)f o r
all T  N. Hence, it suces to show ((vL)jT) 2 C((vL)jT) for all T  N.
Without loss of generality assume player 1 is the central player in the star graph. Let
T  N. We will distinguish between two cases: (i) 1 62 T and (ii) 1 2 T.
(i) 1 62 T. For all S  T, vL(S)=
P
i 2 Sv ( f i g )a n d i((vL)jT)=v ( f i g ) for all i 2 T so,
((vL)jT) 2 C((vL)jT).
(ii) 1 2 T. We will show that
P
i2S i((vL)jT)  (vL)jT(S) for all S  T.L e tS T .
We will distinguish between two cases again: (ii-a) 1 62 S and (ii-b) 1 2 S.
(ii-a) 1 62 S. Hence, vL(S)=
P
i 2 Sv ( f i g ). Let i 2 S.C o n s i d e rRTwith i 2 R.S i n c e
(vjR) 2 C(vjR)i th o l d st h a t i( v j R)v ( f i g )a n d
P




 j( v j R)v ( R nfig)+v( fig) : (8)
i((vL)jT) is a convex combination of fvL(R) − vL(Rnfig)gRT: i2R.S i n c e




v ( R )−v ( R nfig), i f 1 2 R
v ( f i g ) − v ( ; ), i f 1 62 R
;
it follows that i((vL)jT) is a convex combination of fv(R) − v(Rnfig)gRT: i2R.U s i n g




i2S v(fig)=( v L) j T( S).17
(ii-b) 1 2 S.S i n c e ( N;Pv) is average convex, we have (vjT) 2 C(T;vjT), implying
P
i2S i(vjT)  v(S)=v L ( S ). Since the Shapley value is ecient, it suces to show





i 2 Tn S






 i( v j T) :
So, it remains to show that i((vL)jT)  i(vjT) for all i 2 TnS. Denote the unanimity




> > > <
> > > :
0 ; if 1 62 R and jRj2
 R ; if jRj =1o rj R j=2a n d12R
 R+ R nf1g ; jRj3a n d12R
:
Let i 2 TnS,s oi6 =1 .T h e n
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Theorem 4.1 implies that a game (N;w), where w =
P
RN RuR is average con-
vex if and only if the the zero-normalization of this game (N;w), where w =
P
RN;jRj2RuR, is average convex, since the unanimity coordinates of one-person coali-
tions appear with coecient 0 in condition (7). Consider the game (Tnf1g;w)w i t h
w=
P
R  T nf1g;jRj2
R
jRjuR. This game is the zero-normalization of the average convex
potential game (Tnf1g;P(v jTnf1g)), so (Tnf1g;w) is average convex as well. Applying






Hence expression (9) is non-negative. This completes the proof.
2
8See Owen (1986) for relations between unanimity coordinates of (N;v) and unanimity coordinates
of (N;vL).18
Remark 4.1 Let (N;v) be a cooperative game with an average convex associated po-
tential game. Let S  N and T  NnS.T h e n
v ( S[ T )=
X
i 2 S [ T
 i( v j S [ T)=
X
i 2 S
 i( v j S [ T)+
X
i 2 T
 i( v j S[ T)v( S)+v( T) ;
where the inequality follows since (vjS[T) 2 C(S [ T;vjS[T). So, average convexity of
the potential game implies superadditivity of the underlying cooperative game.
In the remainder of this section we will show that the class of graphs that guarantee
inheritance of average convexity of the associated potential game coincides with the class
of graphs that guarantee inheritance of average convexity of the original game by the
graph-restricted game.
The following lemma shows that for every graph that is not cycle-complete we can
nd a game with an average convex associated potential game, while the potential game
corresponding to the graph-restricted game is not average convex.
Lemma 4.2 Let (N;L) be a communication graph that is not cycle-complete. Then
there exists a game (N;v) with an average convex associated potential game such that
the potential game associated with the graph-restricted game (N;vL) is not average
convex.
Proof: Since (N;L) is not cycle-complete there exists a cycle (x1;:::;x k;x 1)a n di;j 2
f1;:::;kg, i<j−1, with fxi;x jg6 2L . Dene v = ufxi;xjg. Hence, Pv =
1
2ufxi;xjg is
average convex, Pv is even convex. Since fxi;x jg6 2Lit holds that vL(fxi;x jg)=0 .
The graph-restricted game (N;vL) is determined by a set W,w h e r eS2Wif and
only if there exists C 2 S=L : fxi;x jgC .N o t e t h a t i f T S and S 2Wthen
T 2W .S i n c ev L ( S )=1 ,i fS2W ,a n dv L( S ) = 0, otherwise, this implies that (N;vL)
is monotonic.
Let  be the set of all orders of N. Then the Shapley value of a player is the average
over all orders in  of the marginal contribution of this player to the set of players
who precede him. Note that by monotonicity every marginal contribution of a player is
non-negative and hence, every player receives a non-negative payo. Since vL(N)=1i t
follows that players xi and xj together receive at most one according to a specic order.
Since they both receive zero if these two players are rst and second in an order, we nd
xi(vL)+ x j( v L)<1.
By non-negativity of the payos and the eciency of the Shapley value we have
Pk
l=1 xl(vL)  1, so
Pk













Since vL(fxi;x i+1;:::;x jg)=v L ( f x j ;:::;x k;x 1;:::;x ig) = 1 we nd that (vL) 62
C(vL) and thus (N;P(vL)) is not average convex.
2
The following two examples are based on examples 3.1 and 3.2.
Example 4.2 Let (N;w) be the 4-person game with
w =1 2 u f 1 ; 4 g+1 2 u f 2 ; 3 g+1 2 u f 3 ; 4 g+9 u f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g+9 u f 1 ; 2 ; 4 g−9 u f 1 ; 3 ; 4 g−9 u f 2 ; 3 ; 4 g−8 u N:
Then (N;Pw) coincides with the game of example 3.1. Furthermore, let L =
ff1;2g;f2;3g;f3;4g;f4;2gg. Hence (N;L) is the graph of example 3.1. Some straight-
forward calculations show that (N;P(wL)) is not average convex.
Example 4.3 Let (N;w) be the 4-person game with
w =1 6 u f 1 ; 2 g+1 6 u f 2 ; 4 g+1 6 u f 3 ; 4 g−6 u f 1 ; 2 ; 4 g−6 u f 2 ; 3 ; 4 g−4 u N:
Then (N;Pw) coincides with the game of example 3.2. Furthermore, let L =
ff1;2g;f2;3g;f3;4gg.S o , ( N;L) corresponds to the graph of example 3.2. Some
straightforward calculations show that (N;P(wL)) is not average convex.
Examples 4.2 and 4.3 will be used to show that every cycle-complete connected graph
that is not a star graph nor the complete graph does not guarantee inheritance of average
convexity of the potential game by the potential game corresponding to the graph-
restricted game. Finally, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.3 Let (N;v;L) be a communication situation. The game (N;P(vL)) is aver-
age convex if and only if for all C 2 N=L the game (C;(P(vL))jC) is average convex.
Proof: Denote the unanimity coordinates of (N;vL)b y(  R) R  N.T h e n

















for all S  N,where the second equality holds since R =0i fRis not contained in a
component C 2 N=L. Now, the proof goes along the same lines as the proof of lemma
3.3
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Lemma 4.4 Let (N;L) be a communication graph such that for every (N;v)w i t ha v e r -
age convex (N;Pv) it holds that (N;P(vL)) is average convex. Let C 2 N=L.I f( C;w)
has an average convex associated potential game (C;Pw)t h e n( C;P(wL(C))) is average
convex.
Proof: Along the same lines as the proof of lemma 3.4.
2
We can now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3 Let (N;L) be a communicationgraph. Then the following two statements
are equivalent:
(i) For all C 2 N=L it holds that (C;L(C)) is a complete graph or a star graph.
(ii) For all games (N;v) with an average convex associated potential game the graph-
restricted game (N;vL) has an average convex associated potential game.
Proof: The proof goes along the same lines as the proofs of theorems 3.3 and 3.4 using
lemmas 3.1, 3.2, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, theorem 4.2, and examples 4.2 and 4.3.
2
5R e m a r k
Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992) dene the link game (L;r) corresponding to a commu-
nication situation (N;v;L)w h e r er ( A )=v A ( N ) for all A  L.9 The position value








where  denotes the Shapley value and Li = ffi;jg2Ljj2Ng .
Nouweland and Borm (1991) nd that the link game (L;r) corresponding to com-
munication situation (N;v;L)i sc o n v e xi f( N;v)i sc o n v e xa n d( N;L) cycle free. The
following example shows that we cannot nd a similar result for average convex games.
Example 5.1 Consider the communication situation (N;v;L)w i t hN=f 1 ;2 ;3 g ,vthe
characteristic function with v(f1;2g)=v ( f 2 ; 3 g )=2 ,v ( N )=3 ,v ( S )=0o t h e r w i s e ,
and L = ff1;2g;f2;3gg.D e n o t e a = f 1 ; 2 g and b = f2;3g.T h e n w e h a v e r ( f a g )=
r ( f b g )=2a n dr ( f a;bg)=3 .S o ,( L;r) is not average convex, although (N;v) is average
convex and (N;L) is cycle-free. Note that in fact (N;L) is a star graph. Furthermore,
note that adding the link f1;3g to the set L will also result in a link game that is not
average convex.
9In Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992) (L;r)i sr e f e r r e dt oa st h earc game.21
The example above can easily be extended to show that there exists no graph (N;L)
with at least one component containing at least two links which guarantees that average
convexity of (N;v) is inherited by (L;r).
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